Skip to content
QuenchWorks

concourse

Image · CI/CD & registry · standard · v8.3.3

D 2cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-11-22

Concourse CI, built from the release tag with its web UI compiled and embedded in the one Go binary, the containerd, grpc and otel modules floated to their fixed releases. The web node (ATC and TSA) runs nonroot on a read-only rootfs against an external PostgreSQL; the worker runs privileged on Wolfi's containerd and runc with the CNI plugins built from source, and bundles the registry-image and time resource types built from their tags. The git resource type is its own image, concourse-git-resource.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:f1ca6c197e4f282aab0a0c14ade409088cef9b8722a709e29549ccc0e0ac347b

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
115.4 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
8.3.3latest115.4 MB2026-11-22sha256:4854f2323957…

Security report (Trivy)

D· 84/1001 fixable · rebuild clears it

Vulnerability detail

concourse 8.3.3 · 2 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-95839HIGHgithub.com/containerd/containerd/v2v2.3.62.2.10, 2.3.7, 2.4.2github.com/containerd/containerd/v2: containerd: Denial of Service via malformed image manifest digest
GHSA-g98v-hv3f-hcfrLOWatty0.2.14, not fixableatty potential unaligned read
0
Critical
1
High
0
Medium
1
Low
0
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 357 · cleared 5× · median 2 days to fix18 of 146 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-11-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/concourse:8.3.3

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/concourse@sha256:f1ca6c197e4f282aab0a0c14ade409088cef9b8722a709e29549ccc0e0ac347b

Tags

8.3.38.3.3-amd648.3.3-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
8.3.3
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
Apache-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature, built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/concourse:8.3.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance, which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/concourse:8.3.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM, the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/concourse:8.3.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://concourse-ci.org