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QuenchWorks

etcd

Image · Coordination · critical · v3.7.1

C 6cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-09-06

Distributed, strongly consistent key-value store using Raft consensus. The backing store for Kubernetes and a building block for service coordination and config.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:05765ee83074c7d86b361a33f6a5cb6846e2985a2b6894851c0fa3efd6a2bba7

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Image
ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/etcd:3.7.1
Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
22.1 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
3.7.1latest22.1 MB2026-09-06sha256:98d2eeef2560…

Security report (Trivy)

C· 60/1004 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

etcd 3.7.1 · 3 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-56855MEDIUMgolang.org/x/cryptov0.55.00.56.0golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service via crafted messages
CVE-2026-78662MEDIUMgolang.org/x/cryptov0.55.00.56.0golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service via channel request flooding
GO-2026-5932UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/cryptov0.55.0— not fixableThe golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unmaintained, unsafe by design, and has known security issues
0
Critical
0
High
4
Medium
0
Low
2
Unknown

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/etcd:3.7.1

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/etcd@sha256:05765ee83074c7d86b361a33f6a5cb6846e2985a2b6894851c0fa3efd6a2bba7

Tags

3.7.13.7.1-amd643.7.1-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
3.7.1
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
Apache-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/etcd:3.7.1 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/etcd:3.7.1 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/etcd:3.7.1 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

View the Helm chartView package

Upstream project: https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd