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QuenchWorks

floci

Image · Apps & productivity · standard · v2.3.0

D 4cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

Local AWS cloud emulator and LocalStack Community successor, built from source into a Quarkus fast-jar on a hardened Wolfi JRE. The hardened image runs all 55 of Floci's in-process AWS services nonroot with no Docker socket, covering S3, DynamoDB, SQS, SNS, SES, IAM, STS, KMS, Secrets Manager, API Gateway, Cognito, Kinesis, CloudFormation, Step Functions, EventBridge, CloudWatch, Route53, and more. The 10 Docker-backed services (Lambda, RDS, ElastiCache, MSK, ECS, EKS, OpenSearch, ECR, DocumentDB, Neptune) need the host Docker socket plus root and are out of scope for this image.

Version

2.3.0 · latest2.2.02.1.0

The latest line lives at the base page; older lines have their own page so you can pin and verify exactly that version.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:ff8c8d6a7ad956079bad958325466d49a46c6f8fabf7398885e155c3bbaeefa6

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Image
ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/floci:2.3.0
Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
167.6 MB

Published versions

3 tags

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
2.3.0latest167.6 MB2026-10-22sha256:b124d73282c8…
2.2.0168.5 MB2026-10-22sha256:feb40139fa3d…
2.1.0166.8 MB2026-10-22sha256:ff8c8d6a7ad9…

Security report (Trivy)

D· 46/1004 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

floci 2.3.0 · 4 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-102554HIGHcom.google.guava:guava33.6.0-jre33.7.2com.google.guava/guava: Google Guava: Denial of Service via unthrottled memory allocation during deserialization
CVE-2026-108106HIGHorg.xerial.snappy:snappy-java1.1.10.81.1.10.9org.xerial.snappy/snappy-java: snappy-java: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation during decompression
CVE-2026-93451HIGHorg.xerial.snappy:snappy-java1.1.10.81.1.10.9org.xerial/snappy-java: snappy-java: Buffer overflow via malformed compressed input
CVE-2026-116590MEDIUMorg.xerial.snappy:snappy-java1.1.10.81.1.10.9snappy-java: JVM crash from unchecked ranges in Snappy.arrayCopy and SnappyOutputStream.rawWrite
0
Critical
3
High
1
Medium
0
Low
0
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 2533 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/floci:2.3.0

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/floci@sha256:ff8c8d6a7ad956079bad958325466d49a46c6f8fabf7398885e155c3bbaeefa6

Tags

2.3.02.3.0-amd642.3.0-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
2.3.0
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
MIT

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/floci:2.3.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/floci:2.3.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/floci:2.3.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

View the Helm chartView package

Upstream project: https://floci.io