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QuenchWorks

forgejo

Image · Git · standard · v16.0.6

C 4cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

Self-hosted lightweight Git forge (a community Gitea fork) with issues, PRs, CI, and packages. From source with the web UI embedded (no Node at runtime), CGO+static-musl SQLite, on a hardened nonroot Wolfi base; data lives on a writable volume.

Version

The latest line lives at the base page; older lines have their own page so you can pin and verify exactly that version.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:526adfca5ce180724ddb4cc54e06c4616a8cfcc7ae6663b9b8463250e7b69121

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
74.0 MB

Published versions

2 tags

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
16.0.6latest74.0 MB2026-10-22sha256:9e7e825118df…
15.0.1071.6 MB2026-10-22sha256:526adfca5ce1…

Security report (Trivy)

C· 75/1003 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

forgejo 16.0.6 · 4 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-114437MEDIUMgithub.com/go-chi/chi/v5v5.3.25.4.0github.com/go-chi/chi: chi: client IP spoofing via unverified direct connection in ClientIPFromXFF middleware
CVE-2026-78661UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/netv0.60.00.62.0When coalescing adjacent text nodes in addText and fosterParent, appen ...
CVE-2026-97045UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/netv0.60.00.62.0In childTextNodesAreLiteral, walking up the tree previously stopped at ...
GO-2026-5932UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/cryptov0.57.0— not fixableThe golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unmaintained, unsafe by design, and has known security issues
0
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
0
Low
3
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 3454 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/forgejo:16.0.6

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/forgejo@sha256:526adfca5ce180724ddb4cc54e06c4616a8cfcc7ae6663b9b8463250e7b69121

Tags

16.0.616.0.6-amd6416.0.6-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
16.0.6
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
GPL-3.0+

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/forgejo:16.0.6 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/forgejo:16.0.6 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/forgejo:16.0.6 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://forgejo.org