mattermost

Image · Messaging · standard · v11.10.1

C 5cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-09-06

Open-source, self-hosted team messaging and collaboration platform (a Slack alternative) with channels, direct messages, file sharing, and integrations. Packaged from Mattermost's official Team Edition server release; requires an external PostgreSQL.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:64b7d095520772ad16fa0cd4bbf0df097398829c26cf9cbc87aed2287064ca2d

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Image

ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mattermost:11.10.1

Signed

cosign keyless

SBOM

SPDX, on digest

Provenance

SLSA build

Architectures

amd64, arm64

Runs as

nonroot (uid 1001)

Root filesystem

read-only

Image size

408.1 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

Version	Size	Published	Digest
11.10.1latest	408.1 MB	2026-09-06	sha256:9393f757b11f…

Security report (Trivy)

C· 69/1003 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

mattermost 11.10.1 · 4 CVE

CVE	Severity	Package	Installed	Fixed in	Title
CVE-2026-18374	MEDIUM	glibc-2.44	2.44-r5	2.44-r6	glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-18374	MEDIUM	glibc-2.44-locale-posix	2.44-r5	2.44-r6	glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-18374	MEDIUM	ld-linux-2.44	2.44-r5	2.44-r6	glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
GO-2026-5932	UNKNOWN	golang.org/x/crypto	v0.56.0	— not fixable	The golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unmaintained, unsafe by design, and has known security issues

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Unknown

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mattermost:11.10.1

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mattermost@sha256:64b7d095520772ad16fa0cd4bbf0df097398829c26cf9cbc87aed2287064ca2d

Tags

11.10.111.10.1-amd6411.10.1-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version: 11.10.1
Architectures: amd64, arm64
Runs as: nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem: read-only
License: AGPL-3.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mattermost:11.10.1 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mattermost:11.10.1 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mattermost:11.10.1 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

View the Helm chart View package

Upstream project: https://mattermost.com