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QuenchWorks

Neo4j

Image · Graph · low · v2026.05.0

F 7cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-08-26

Graph database for highly connected data, queried with Cypher for traversals and relationship-heavy workloads. Community edition is GPLv3.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:c07746a9527c2302fdc24f446cc6d6820ba1b0da076d974a66355030fc78aae4

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
243.7 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
2026.05.0latest243.7 MB2026-08-26sha256:c07746a9527c…

Security report (Trivy)

F· 16/1007 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

neo4j 2026.05.0 · 7 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-75595CRITICALio.netty:netty-handler4.2.16.Final4.2.17.Final, 4.1.137.FinalNetty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. ...
CVE-2026-18374MEDIUMglibc-2.442.44-r12.44-r6glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-18374MEDIUMglibc-2.44-locale-posix2.44-r12.44-r6glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-18374MEDIUMld-linux-2.442.44-r12.44-r6glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-18374MEDIUMlibcrypt1-2.442.44-r12.44-r6glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-75596MEDIUMio.netty:netty-handler4.2.16.Final4.2.17.Final, 4.1.137.FinalNetty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. ...
CVE-2026-85091MEDIUMzlib1.3.2-r41.3.3-r0zlib versions 1.3.1.2 through 1.3.2 contain a heap buffer overflow vul ...
1
Critical
0
High
6
Medium
0
Low
0
Unknown

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/neo4j:2026.05.0

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/neo4j@sha256:c07746a9527c2302fdc24f446cc6d6820ba1b0da076d974a66355030fc78aae4

Tags

2026.05.02026.05.0-amd642026.05.0-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
2026.05.0
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
GPL-3.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/neo4j:2026.05.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/neo4j:2026.05.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/neo4j:2026.05.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://github.com/neo4j/neo4j