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QuenchWorks

tigerbeetle

Image · Database · standard · v0.17.9

C 4cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-08-26

Distributed financial-grade accounting database for high-throughput double-entry bookkeeping. Ships a single self-contained static Zig binary; speaks its own binary protocol (not HTTP) on port 3000.

Version

The latest line lives at the base page; older lines have their own page so you can pin and verify exactly that version.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:cf19b80714fa791e49a1c005c4306f9b1f42b43d01fe887b6abc9aaf8b916db0

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
11.6 MB

Published versions

3 tags

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
0.17.9latest11.6 MB2026-08-26sha256:cf19b80714fa…
0.17.811.6 MB2026-08-26sha256:e0117e28b085…
0.17.411.4 MB2026-08-26sha256:152de04cd6f2…

Security report (Trivy)

C· 64/1004 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

tigerbeetle 0.17.9 · 4 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-18374MEDIUMglibc-2.442.44-r12.44-r6glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-18374MEDIUMglibc-2.44-locale-posix2.44-r12.44-r6glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-18374MEDIUMld-linux-2.442.44-r12.44-r6glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
CVE-2026-18374MEDIUMlibcrypt1-2.442.44-r12.44-r6glibc: glibc: Heap buffer overflow via attacker-controlled fopen mode string
0
Critical
0
High
4
Medium
0
Low
0
Unknown

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tigerbeetle:0.17.9

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tigerbeetle@sha256:cf19b80714fa791e49a1c005c4306f9b1f42b43d01fe887b6abc9aaf8b916db0

Tags

0.17.90.17.9-amd640.17.9-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
0.17.9
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
Apache-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tigerbeetle:0.17.9 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tigerbeetle:0.17.9 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tigerbeetle:0.17.9 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://github.com/tigerbeetle/tigerbeetle