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QuenchWorks

tinyauth

Image · Security & supply chain · standard · v5.2.0

D 3cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-11-15

Tinyauth: a lightweight login portal and forward-auth server for Traefik, nginx and Caddy, with local users, TOTP, OAuth and OpenID Connect providers. Built from source, the web UI with pnpm and embedded in the Go binary; runs as uid 1001.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:dff9fbbf1e95d580ff1cb0e26e32bcd18808ba22980703ed5fd1bea32c204f6c

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
16.1 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
5.2.0latest16.1 MB2026-11-15sha256:dff9fbbf1e95…

Security report (Trivy)

D· 76/1003 open · no upstream fix yet

Vulnerability detail

tinyauth 5.2.0 · 3 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-41567HIGHgithub.com/docker/dockerv28.5.2+incompatible, not fixabledocker: Moby/Docker Engine: Arbitrary Code Execution via malicious container image and compressed archive upload
CVE-2026-42306HIGHgithub.com/docker/dockerv28.5.2+incompatible, not fixablegithub.com/docker/docker: github.com/moby/moby: Moby container framework: Host file overwrite via race condition in docker cp mount setup
CVE-2026-41568MEDIUMgithub.com/docker/dockerv28.5.2+incompatible, not fixablegithub.com/docker/docker: github.com/moby/moby: Moby: Denial of Service via race condition in docker cp mount setup
0
Critical
2
High
1
Medium
0
Low
0
Unknown

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tinyauth:5.2.0

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tinyauth@sha256:dff9fbbf1e95d580ff1cb0e26e32bcd18808ba22980703ed5fd1bea32c204f6c

Tags

5.2.05.2.0-amd645.2.0-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
5.2.0
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
AGPL-3.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature, built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tinyauth:5.2.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance, which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tinyauth:5.2.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM, the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/tinyauth:5.2.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://tinyauth.app