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QuenchWorks

vllm

Image · Machine learning & AI · standard · v0.32.0

C 5cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

vLLM, the high-throughput LLM inference and serving engine with an OpenAI-compatible API. CPU build — installs vLLM's prebuilt CPU wheel (torch+cpu, no source compile, no CUDA) into a venv on a hardened Wolfi python-3.12 base, 0-CVE across ~140 Python packages. The user supplies the model; the chart runs it as a StatefulSet with a persistent model cache.

Version

The latest line lives at the base page; older lines have their own page so you can pin and verify exactly that version.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:229f56ef3e552a58412f4bf447ec8972c742f195d4188ecd4316a7f2323705f0

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
1.0 GB

Published versions

2 tags

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
0.32.0latest1.0 GB2026-10-22sha256:2991b74f762a…
0.30.01002.6 MB2026-10-22sha256:229f56ef3e55…

Security report (Trivy)

C· 67/1005 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

vllm 0.32.0 · 5 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
GHSA-c8m5-c952-6cm4MEDIUMrustls0.23.450.23.46, 0.24.0-dev.2Rustls: Session Debug formatting exposes TLS master secrets and resumption PSKs
GHSA-h2v8-394m-p7vvLOWrustls0.23.450.23.46, 0.24.0-dev.2Rustls: Brotli certificate decompression can allocate an attacker-controlled amount of memory up to 1 GiB before authentication.
GHSA-vp88-798v-h67fLOWrustls0.23.450.23.46, 0.24.0-dev.2rustls: ECH rejection can expose buffered application data to authenticated outer server before `ech_required` alert
GHSA-w44r-93j7-qv28LOWrustls0.23.450.23.46, 0.24.0-dev.2rustls: An unauthenticated ServerHello poisons the per-name key-exchange record, so later ClientHellos carry only a classical X25519 share
GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52wLOWsetuptools83.0.084.1.0setuptools: Windows path escape via namespace_packages.txt during legacy wheel installation Description
0
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
4
Low
0
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 2366 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vllm:0.32.0

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vllm@sha256:229f56ef3e552a58412f4bf447ec8972c742f195d4188ecd4316a7f2323705f0

Tags

0.32.00.32.0-amd640.32.0-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
0.32.0
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
Apache-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vllm:0.32.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vllm:0.32.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vllm:0.32.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://docs.vllm.ai