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QuenchWorks

zitadel

Image · Identity · standard · v4.17.3

C 2cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-09-13

Cloud-native identity and access management (IAM) with OIDC/OAuth2/SAML, multi-tenancy, and a built-in admin console. Packaged from ZITADEL's official prebuilt binary; event-sourced store on an external PostgreSQL.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:ed99c430e1592dfe6d77a340f141efc78a049695a62a08d51a0e86c6c0f0c142

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
53.7 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
4.17.3latest53.7 MB2026-09-13sha256:ed99c430e159…

Security report (Trivy)

C· 94/1002 open · no upstream fix yet

Vulnerability detail

zitadel 4.17.3 · 2 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2025-47909MEDIUMgithub.com/gorilla/csrfv1.7.3not fixableHosts listed in TrustedOrigins implicitly allow requests from the corr ...
GO-2026-5932UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/cryptov0.56.0not fixableThe golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unmaintained, unsafe by design, and has known security issues
0
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
0
Low
1
Unknown

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/zitadel:4.17.3

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/zitadel@sha256:ed99c430e1592dfe6d77a340f141efc78a049695a62a08d51a0e86c6c0f0c142

Tags

4.17.34.17.3-amd644.17.3-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
4.17.3
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
AGPL-3.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/zitadel:4.17.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/zitadel:4.17.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/zitadel:4.17.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://zitadel.com